Kamis, 23 Juni 2011

Housing Singapore

See the table comparing the 3 models below.

We are currently using Model (B), which is an attempt to somewhat "partially satisfy all parties involved". A mutant solution.

From a socialist perspective, the most ideal situation is Model (A). It is the model that allows citizens to maximise their benefits, e.g. profits from the public flat. However, it takes a lot of discipline, motivation and the RIGHT HEART from the government, especially MND and HDB, to pull off Model (A) in a sustainable manner.

Model C is logical, but the transition from (B) to (C) is daunting. Many casualties will emerge. And the eventual buyers of the lowest priced private housing will suffer the most, i.e. those between the bottom 10%-20% of households, which include young couples and struggling mature households.

In general, these models do not address the issue of high resale flat prices, which is caused by other factors such as sudden inflow of foreigners. Model (C) may address this issue slightly, but it will simply mean major bleeding of public funds, and eventual unhappiness amongst those in a financial crunch.

MODEL
(A)
HDB Monopoly
(B)
HDB + Private Developers
(C)
90% Private Housing
Developer of housing for lowest 10% of Households
  • HDB provides subsidised flats for this class of Singaporeans and PRs.
  • HDB to provides subsidised flats for this class of Singaporeans and PRs.
  • HDB to provide subsidised flats for this class of Singaporeans only.
Developer of housing for next 10% to 80% of Households
  • HDB provides public flats for this class of Singaporeans and PRs
  • Private sector developers to bid for all or some public housing parcels.
  • No more public housing parcels. All housing parcels for bid are deemed as ‘private’.
  • This means foreigners can also buy a piece of this new 70% of private housing.
Subsidies
  • New HDB flat sold at subsidized prices
  • Other subsidies based on buyers’ profile.
  • Acceptance of subsidies = Minimum Occupation Period
  • HDB provides subsidies based on bottom 80% buyers’ profile.
  • Acceptance of subsidies = standard Minimum Occupation Period of 5 years
  • HDB becomes a stat board which specialises in the study and segmentation of Singaporeans by housing needs, and translation of these needs into subsidies.
  • Subsidies are tied to the buyer, and no longer tied to the property type, e.g. public/private or new/resale
  • Acceptance of subsidies = Minimum Occupation Period (MOP).
  • Higher subsidies = longer MOP
Estate Maintenance
  • Town Council
  • Town Council
  • Private
PROS
(From home buyers’ pov)
  • Lower prices as HDB controls quality and pricing of public flats
  • High profit margins gained when selling HDB flats to resale market
  • Government pays all/ most of flat/estate upgrading costs
  • For HDB-developed flats, the pros are the same of those of Model A.
  • Private sector participation (e.g. DBSS) = Better design, finishings, aftersales services etc?
  • More people can qualify as buyers.
  • More options available
  • Shiok feeling of owning a 'private property'
  • May lead to better design, finishings, aftersales services etc.
(From government’s pov)
  • More control over supply and demand
  • Can claim to have enabled private sector participation, i.e. created jobs in these industries
  • Can be devolved of responsibilities for quality of housing
  • Can focus on supply of housing land and subsidies
  • In fact, HDB can pass the responsibility of housing land supply to URA, and focus on subsidies only.
  • Can claim to have enabled private sector participation, i.e. created jobs in these industries
(From private sector’s pov)





  • -
  • Can participate in and profit from this larger segment of housing provision in SG
  • Can participate in and profit from this even larger segment of housing provision in SG
CONS
(From home buyers’ pov)
  • Not all qualify as public flat buyers
  • Design of estate/flat layout and furnishings is limited by HDB’s imagination, budget and overall motivation.
  • At the mercy of developers, estate managers, and 'free market':
  • Private sector are free to charge high prices
  • Low or no margins gained by selling the flat to resale market.
  • As more developers participate, the consistency of quality (design, finishings etc) will be difficult to maintain, especially those at lower end of pricing range.
  • Home buyers will have to deal with developers directly, instead of dealing with HDB.
  • Buying private housing means there will no longer be upgrading of the flats/estate paid for by government.
(From government’s pov)
  • Difficult to provide housing for and to satisfy 80% of households in SG in terms of timing, quality, and quantity
  • Subsidies creamed off by developers immediately.
  • Unhappiness from public over high prices
  • No control of majority of housing in SG, i.e. loss of political negotiation chip.
  • Subsidies will be creamed off by developers, though not as much as they were able to in Model B.
  • Unhappiness from public over high prices
(From private sector’s pov)





  • Limited participation in this sector, i.e. only construction
  • Limited potential buyers, i.e. cannot sell the flats to foreigners
  • -

Ideally, a hybrid of (A) and (C) should help our situation, i.e.
  • HDB is the sole provider of housing for majority of all households. It can be 90%, 80% or even 51%. Depends on how much control the government wishes to retain.
  • HDB to build flats, then sell them. Not the other way round.
  • HDB to sell flats to buyers on a cost-recovery basis.
  • HDB to improve on aesthetics of flats, e.g. provide flat furnishing so that households do not have to take on expensive renovation loans.
  • HDB to improve on its aftersales service.
  • HDB to expand buyers eligibility to allow more people to buy flats, e.g. singles etc.
  • HDB to review income ceiling, e.g. tie it to a function of median HH income and cost of public flat.
  • HDB to tie subsidies to the buyer, instead of the flat. This means, the same subsidies are also applicable to resale public flat buyers.
  • Higher subsidy amounts = Longer MOP. Develop a transparent Subsidy amount vs MOP scale. There should be a clearly different scale for PRs to differentiate between the rights of Citizens and PRs.
  • Equally transparent list of 5-year estate upgrading plans and criteria.
The entry was thought of and drafted in 60 minutes by Blinkymummy alone. I'm sure the entire team in HDB and MND can do much better, given more resources such as high CEP officers, access to data, time... and of course, HEART.

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